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Abstract 
Before first beam is injected into LHC, the large part of 
the protection systems that does not require beam for 
commissioning will already have been formally validated. 
Some systems require to be commissioned with beam at 
the start of beam operation. With increasing stored 
energy, increased performance of some protection 
systems is required, and also additional systems must be 
commissioned. It is proposed to define operational stages 
with limits on the stored beam energy. An increase of the 
stored energy, either by filling more beam, or by 
increasing the maximum energy, requires formal 
validation of the protection systems that are required for 
the next stage of operation, and an agreement between 
operation and machine protection experts to go on. The 
functions of a ‘Machine Protection Coordination Team’ 
are proposed.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Machine Protection System (MPS) has to 
guarantee the safe operation of the LHC. A not properly 
working MPS can lead to significant damage of LHC 
components and long downtime periods [1]. For this 
reason commissioning of the MPS needs to be done with 
great care and the details of the commissioning need to be 
well defined in advance. The commissioning of the MPS 
will be a recurring task during the commissioning of the 
LHC but also after shutdowns and access periods. 
Figure 1 gives and overview of the MPS and the 
systems connected to it. It shows the complexity of the 
system [2]. To commission such a complex and important 
systems, a clear strategy and formal procedures are 
required. 
SYSTEMS TO BE COMMISSIONED 
The systems to be commissioned can be divided in four 
groups, each consisting of a number of subsystems. 
The first group consists of the core of the system: 
• The Beam Interlock System (BIS) 
• The LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS) 
The second group consists of the systems connected to the 
MPS: 
• Beam Loss Monitors (BLM) 
• Quench Protection and Power Interlock Controllers 
• Collimation System 
• Etc. 
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Figure 1: Overview of the Machine protection system and the connected equipment. 
LHC Project Workshop - 'Chamonix XV'
82
The third group consists of the related hardware systems: 
• Safe Beam Parameters 
• Beam Presence Flag 
The fourth group consists of the related software systems: 
• Post Mortem system 
• Management of Critical Settings (MCS) 
• Software Interlock System (SIS) 
• Sequencer 
STAGES IN COMMISSIONING 
Without Beam 
The commissioning of the MPS and the connected 
equipment starts with tests in the laboratory, followed by 
equipment tests in the machine. This is followed by the 
hardware commissioning, where the equipment is tested 
under normal operating conditions and the interface 
between the different systems has to be tested. A 
maximum of functions should be tested without beam: the 
individual equipment and their interface but also the Post 
Mortem system, sequencer, Safe Beam Parameters etc., 
even if they can only be partially tested without beam. 
With Beam 
Many systems, like the BLMs, the collimators and the 
LBDS will also need to be commissioned with beam. The 
tests will consist of individual system tests and tests of the 
interface between the systems. These tests will need to be 
repeated at the different stages of the LHC commissioning 
and can depend on: 
• The beam intensity 
• The beam energy 
• The different operational states, like optics (squeeze), 
polarities of the magnets of the experiments or 
proton – ion operation. 
DEFINITION OF THE STAGES 
The different stages of commissioning can be defined 
according on the increasing risk during the operational 
period or according to the operation state of the machine 
which has not been checked before. After the 
commissioning of a certain stage, the operation should be 
declared safe for the given conditions (intensity, energy, 
state). Operation outside these conditions should not be 
allowed. 
The ‘jump’ to the next stage should be small enough so 
that the commissioning process itself is safe. Several 
systems might move into the next stage together, but only 
one should be commissioned at a time.  
The systems can be classified in two groups: the system 
which only need to be commissioned once and are either 
‘on’ or ‘off’. These systems can already be commissioned 
at an earlier stage than formally required. This is in 
contrast with the systems that need to be retested at 
several instances to check there behavior under the 
different beam conditions. They will need to re-
commissioned at each stage defined for this system. 
The definition of the stages needed for Machine 
Protection commissioning will need to be more refined 
than the ones defined for the LHC commissioning [3]. A 
general overview of different stages and the systems 
which are required for these stages are given in [4]. This 
will need to be further refined for the actual MPS 
commissioning plan. 
To simultaneously commission all the different systems 
requires a complex description of the different stages and 
the machine protection elements required. For the main 
systems, the logical order of commissioning for the same 
stage seems to be: fist the commissioning of the injection 
system, followed by the LBDS, the other systems (as 
required for diagnostics), the BLM system and last the 
collimation system. 
The different stages might not follow in a ‘linear order’ 
like always increasing beam intensity As an example: it 
might well be possible that injection has already been 
commissioned up to higher intensities, followed by the 
first energy ramp which will need to be done with a pilot 
beam. 
FORMAL TEST PROCEDURES 
The tests to be performed during the commissioning of 
the MPS should be established and agreed upon well 
before the tests will be made. If the test results are 
negative (the conditions are not met) the operation of the 
LHC should not be allowed to move to the next stage. 
This can be tests either with or without beam. Similar 
procedures as already in place for the LHC hardware 
commissioning could be used.  
Formal MPS test procedures should already be used in 
2006 for the commissioning of the following beam 
operations: 
• CNGS operation with nominal intensity 
• TI 8 operation with high(er) intensity 
• TT40 operation with high intensity LHC type beams 
(collimator tests) 
• Sector test (low intensity, but important to check 
functionality and to establish procedures). 
MACHINE PROTECTION 
COORDINATION TEAM 
The creation of a Machine Protection Coordination 
Team (MPCT) is proposed. This team would have the 
following tasks: 
• Definition of the different stages of the 
commissioning of the MPS. This should be done in 
collaboration with the Operation group and the 
equipment experts. 
• Definition of the details of the different tests to be 
performed for the different types of equipment to go 
from one stage to the next. This is likely to be a 
dynamic specification, which can change during the 
LHC operational period. 
• Declaration of whether a protection system is 
commissioned for a specific stage. 
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• Participation in the commissioning of the MPS. 
• Consultation in the case of non-standard situations. If 
certain pre-defined conditions are not met, the MPCT 
can be consulted if and under which conditions LHC 
operation can continue. This should avoid and rushed 
‘over night’ decision making. 
The MPCT could consist of a small team of machine 
protection experts (4 – 6 persons), always available on 
short notice. If required, a contact person can be assigned 
to be one duty for a period of one week at a time. The 
MPCT can be contacted by the Machine Coordinator, 
EiCs etc. They can also bring any potential dangers, not 
foreseen, to the attention of the operations team and will 
closely follow the machine operation. They will contact 
other MPS specialists if required. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The commissioning of the Machine Protection System 
will take place in stages. The different stages and the 
formal acceptance tests will need to be clearly defined 
and agreed upon before LHC beam operation starts. The 
commissioning should already start with tests without 
beam and during the hardware commissioning period, 
followed by the many different stages with beam. These 
stages can be different for the different equipment types 
and will depend on beam intensity, beam energy and 
machine state. 
The creation of a Machine Protection Coordination 
Team is proposed. Its task will be to formalize the above 
procedures and validate tests. It will consist of a small 
team of experts, available for consultation on short notice. 
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